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A NEW TWIST IN THE DOUBLE HELIX:
ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA
"FINGERPRINTING" IN CALIFORNIA
Adrienne M. Grovert
INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly one of the most attractive aspects of legal prac-
tice is the dynamic nature of the law. Law students and practition-
ers are called upon to keep abreast of developments affecting not
only which remedies are available to whom for what conduct, but
also how one best proves his or her case.I For decades, technologi-
cal advances have found their way into our homes and offices virtu-
ally as fast as we can accommodate them. It is not surprising that
they enter the courtroom and become standard tools of evidence at
a similarly rapid pace.2 As one court observed over thirty years ago
in People v. Spigno:3
Most middle aged lawyers can remember when evidence of the
waves or currents given off by the cerebral'tissue would have
been inadmissible in any proceeding, and would have been con-
sidered fantastic. Today, no one would seriously contend that an
electro-encephalogram would not be proper evidence in certain
cases.
In 1989, the latest technology awaiting acceptance by the courts is
identification of an individual through DNA Analysis.4 Headlines
such as "A New Forensic Test is Revolutionizing Criminal Prose-
cutions"5 are appearing in newspapers, magazines, and bar associa-
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t Candidate for J.D., 1990, Santa Clara University School of Law.
1. Researching this comment has been a case in point. I would like to thank Prof.
George F. Sensabaugh, University of California, Berkeley; Dr. Russell Higuchi, Cetus Corpo-
ration; and Prof. Robert W. Peterson, University of Santa Clara School of Law for their
generosity in devoting considerable time to helping me grasp many new and difficult
concepts.
2. See, eg., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1500.5 (Deering 1986) regarding the impact of com-
puters on the best evidence rule.
3. 156 Cal. App. 2d 279, 289, 319 P.2d 458, 464 (1957).
4. As suggested in the title, the current popular name for this technique is "DNA
Fingerprinting." However, as discussed infra that name has undesirable evidentiary implica-
tions. So as not to produce still more literature describing "DNA Fingerprinting," I have
chosen to refer to the technique within this comment as "DNA Analysis."
5. McCarroll & Samghabad, Convicted by Their Genes, TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 74; see
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tion publications with increasing frequency.' Unfortunately,
ambiguous, exaggerated and unsupported assessments of the tech-
nique's capability are found within most articles, leaving readers
with an altogether false notion of what DNA Analysis can and can-
not do in a forensic context.
The chief aim of this comment is to provide in-depth analysis
of the admissibility of DNA evidence in California under the Kelly/
Frye standard7 for evaluating new scientific evidence.8 In addition,
the technique's potential as a forensic tool for identification9 will be
realistically assessed, and suggestions regarding its implementation
presented. The comment also provides a description of DNA Anal-
ysis itself. This discussion is aimed at explaining to the lay reader
the technology involved, hopefully without oversimplification of the
underlying scientific processes. 10
THE TECHNIQUE AT ISSUE
A Word About Deoxyribonucleic ,4cid (DN4) 11
Nucleic acids comprise one of four classes of molecules of par-
also, eg., Michaud, DNA Detectives, NEW YORK TIMEs MAG., Nov. 6, 1988, at 70; Moss,
DNA-The New Fingerprints, 74 A.B.A.J. 66 (1988).
6. In addition to news media coverage of DNA Analysis, its use in a British murder
investigation is the subject of a recently published non-fiction novel: J. WAMBAUGH, THE
BLOODING (1989).
7. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
8. At this writing, no California appellate court has yet admitted DNA Analysis evi-
dence. Outside California, DNA Analysis received its first appellate level approval on Oct.
20, 1988 in Andrews v. Florida, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.). Trial courts in several
jurisdictions (including New York, Florida, Washington, Pennsylvania, Kansas and
Oklahoma) have admitted DNA evidence, as have courts in Great Britain, where forensic use
of the technique was first developed; see White & Greenwood, DNA Fingerprinting and the
Law, 51 MOD. L. REv. 145 (1988).
9. This comment focuses on admissibility and use in a criminal context. DNA Analy-
sis also raises important issues in the areas of paternity and immigration law and in civil
liberties. See White & Greenwood, supra note 8.
10. Suggested articles for readers interested in the actual technical literature: Jeffreys,
Wilson & Thein, Hypervariable "Minisatellite" Regions in Human DNA, 314 NATURE 67
(1984), and Individual Specific "Fingerprints" of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76 (1985); Sen-
sabaugh, Forensic Biology-Is Recombinant DNA Technology in its Future?, 31 J. FORENSIC
Sci. 393 (1986); Kanter, Baird, Shaler & Balazs, Analysis of Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphisms in DNA Recovered From Dried Bloodstains, 31 J. FORENSIC Sci. 403 (1985);
Giusti, Baird, Pasquale, Balazs, Glassberg,Application of DNA Polymorphisms to the Analysis
of DNA Recovered from Sperm, 31 J. FORENSIC Sci. 409 (1986).
11. The description of DNA included in this comment is based on presentation of this
material in D. HARTL, OUR UNCERTAIN HERITAGE 218-22 (1977); readers wishing to
familiarize themselves further with the scientific background can probably find information
presented in a manner accessible to the layperson in most any introductory.level textbook on
genetics or molecular biology. Other helpful sources-particularly for describing the
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ticular biological importance, the other three classes being proteins,
carbohydrates and lipids. Of the nucleic acids, DNA is the focus of
much attention because it is the storage site for all genetic informa-
tion in any living thing. DNA is found within cells as an extraordi-
narily long, threadlike molecule, consisting actually of two threads
intertwined with each other, like the red and white stripes of a bar-
ber pole. DNA molecules exist "balled up" inside cells, but if a
single DNA molecule found within the average human chromo-
some were stretched out to its full length, it would measure approxi-
mately one and a half inches. To conceptualize these dimensions on
a larger scale: if a DNA molecule were as thick as a strand of spa-
ghetti, it would be over ten miles long. The structure of DNA is
known as a double helix.12 "Double" refers to the two intertwined
threads; "helix" refers to the coiled shape of the molecule, similar to
a spiral staircase. Each of the two threads of a molecule of DNA is
made up of "beads" called nucleotides, which can be grouped into
four bases: adenine (A), guanine (G), thymine (T), and cytosine
(C). Each "bead" on one of the strands in a molecule is paired with
a complementary "bead" on the other strand according to the fol-
lowing rule: where one strand has an A, its partner strand has a T;
where one strand has a G, the other has a C. Each molecule of
human DNA contains approximately three billion such base pairs.
Therein lies the basis for identification through analysis of an indi-
vidual's DNA: the sequence of the three billion A, T, G, and C
base pairs within a strand of DNA is theoretically unique to the
individual.13
technique of DNA Analysis to judges or juries-may be J.D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX
(1968); J. GOCKNICK, A CARTOON GUIDE TO GENETICS.
12. The double-helical structure was first discovered in 1953 by James Watson and
Francis Crick, working at Cambridge University; see Watson & Crick, Molecular Structure of
Nucleic Acids, 171 NATURE 737 (1953), regarded as one of the most significant reports in the
history of biology.
13. A new focus of DNA research is the Human Genome Project. The fifteen year
project is aimed at mapping the DNA within human chromosomes in hopes of one day being
able to identify all three billion base pairs in terms of the location of particular bits of genetic
information in the DNA chain. See e.g, Nash & Thompson, Solving the Mysteries of Hered-
ity, TIME, March 20, 1989 at 62. At this time, the sites of hereditary traits, diseases etc.,
within the DNA molecule remain virtually unknown. However, the eventual mapping of
DNA could have significant impact on DNA Analysis: such information would allow re-
searchers to check that restriction fragment lengths obtained as part of the test are not merely
indicators of gender, eye color, hair texture or other traits shared by millions of people; but
rather are uniquely identifying genetic features. DNA mapping will be of great potential
importance for forensic identification by someday enabling scientists to examine specific sites
within DNA found at a crime scene and formulate a detailed description of the individual
from which it came. Identification based on DNA mapping is at least twenty years away,
however. In the meantime, the possibility that restriction enzymes in particular DNA Analy-
1989]
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Techniques Involved in DNA Analysis14
Bearing in mind the basis for uniqueness, i.e., that each person
possesses a DNA nucleotide sequence which is uniquely his or her
own, 5 it is now important to separate theory from practice and
briefly describe the forensic test responsible for so many expecta-
tions in the legal community. Worth noting at the outset is a fact
rarely taken into account in any assessment of the technique's po-
tential significance: DNA Analysis does not compare the entire se-
quence of a defendant's DNA with the entire sequence of the DNA
obtained from biological samples found at a crime scene. Were that
the case, the notion of absolutely identifying the perpetrator of a
crime would be justified, based on an exact match of all three-bil-
lion-or-so base pairs. What DNA Analysis does do is identify an
individual based on an extremely low probability that the DNA ob-
tained from a defendant and the DNA obtained from crime scene
samples came from two different individuals. The likelihood that
the analyzed pieces of DNA from the crime scene would "match"1 6
only the defendant's DNA can, according to proponents, approach
theoretical certainty of identification. 7 Nonetheless, the point
bears repeating that this remains an identification based on
probability, namely, the probability that nucleotide sequences from
different individuals would not produce the same result when "cut
up" and analyzed in the manner described below.
There exists, then, a huge conceptual difference between theory
and practice: in theory, no two people are alike; in practice, no two
people should test alike. While this distinction may not ultimately
alter the weight of DNA evidence in the courtroom, the risk of ig-
noring the difference is that the trier of fact may assign weight to
the evidence based on misconceptions of what the evidence actually
represents.
The technique which is currently the most frequently em-
ployed in performing DNA Analysis is called Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphism (RFLP). 8 This form of DNA Analysis can
ses could produce fragments representing nothing more than the most common genetic char-
acteristics is one which deserves further scrutiny.
14. For other discussions of this area see Comment, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities
and Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 455 (1988); MOENSSENS et al.,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CAsES 356-58 3d ed. 1986.
15. The case of identical twins is the exception to this rule.
16. A "match" in this context means basically that the pattern of DNA fragments is the
same in both samples tested; six to eight such lengths are typically compared in the test.
17. Circumstantial evidence will likely exist as well, adding to the degree of certainty.
18. There are three laboratories in the United States presently performing DNA Analy-
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be broken down into five basic steps.
1. DNA is extracted from the cells of the sample to be tested
(blood, semen, hair, skin etc.). 19 The DNA is then evaluated on the
basis of quality and quantity.20
2. The DNA obtained in Step 121 is then treated with mole-
cules called restriction enzymes which are "programmed" to "cut"
the DNA at certain pre-determined points ("restriction sites") in
the DNA nucleotide sequence. Different restriction enzymes recog-
nize different sequences, generally ranging in length from four to
eight bases (although enzymes which recognize longer sequences
are also available.) For example, Restriction Enzyme #1 might cut
the DNA everytime it recognizes the base sequence GGCC, Re-
striction Enzyme #2 might cut after every GAATTC sequence,
etc. Because the order of bases in an individual's DNA is a con-
stant, exposing that individual's DNA to a certain restriction en-
zyme will produce the same pieces every time.
3. The fragments of DNA obtained in Step 2 are then
"sorted" according to their length. This is achieved by placing the
fragments into a gel slab (resembling the consistency of Jell-O).
Electrical current is then applied to the gel, causing the DNA
sis for forensic application. They are Cellmark Diagnostics of Germantown, Maryland;
Lifecodes Corp. of Valhalla, New York, and Cetus Corp. of Emeryville, California. All three
perform substantially the same analysis, but with some variations. The most common form
of DNA Analysis is called Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP). Cetus
Corp. is the only one of the three to utilize a technique called the "polymerase chain reaction
(PCR)" which uses an in vitro reaction to synthesize exact copies of the DNA being analyzed.
Cetus claims that the PCR technique permits analysis of quantities of DNA which would be
prohibitively small by other methods' standards. For example, where RFLP analysis without
PCR would require five or six hairs in order to obtain enough DNA, experiments using the
PCR technique have produced analyzable results from the DNA obtained from a single hair.
On PCR (a/k/a DNA amplification) see Higuchi, von Beroldingen, Sensabaugh & Erlich,
DNA Typing From Single Hairs, 332 NATURE 543 (1988); Erlich, Gelfand and Saki, Specific
DNA Amplification, 331 NATURE 461 (1988); Saiki, Gelfand, Stoffel, Scharf, Higuchi, Horn,
Mullis & Erlich, Primer-Directed Enzymatic Amplification of DNA with a Thermostable DNA
Polymerase, 239 SCIENCE 487 (1988).
19. Extraction of DNA is achieved by subjecting the sample to a solution containing a
detergent and proteinase which breaks down cells, freeing nucleic acids, proteins and lipids.
The sample is then treated with a phenol and water solution (carbolic acid) in which the
proteins, lipids etc. end up in the denser phenol layer, while the nucleic acids end up in the
water layer. Ethynol is then added, enabling collection of the nucleic acids from the solution.
20. The amount of DNA contained in the samples to be tested is not of great impor-
tance because identification is based on the location rather than density of the dark bands
produced on an autoradiograph. (See discussion infra.) Exact molecular measurement is
thus not a critical aspect of the test. The quality of the DNA obtained is important, however,
as a very damaged sample precludes DNA analysis.
21. Standard laboratory procedure at each step in the process is to use halof the mate-
rial available at that point, saving the other half should any need arise for retesting.
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(which is by nature negatively charged) to migrate toward the posi-
tively charged end of the gel. The shorter the fragment, the less
resistance it encounters in passing through the gel and thus the far-
ther it will travel in a given time.
4. A procedure known as a "Southern Blot" (named for its
inventor) is then performed which basically transfers the DNA
fragments-now arranged within the gel according to their
length-to a sheet of specially prepared paper, preserving their posi-
tions exactly as they were in the gel.
The DNA fragments are also "denatured" at this time, that is,
the two strands which form the molecule are separated from one
another for the purpose of creating and applying probes. Because
there are at this stage fragments of up to a million different lengths,
probes are used to identify and examine fragments of only a few of
those lengths. A probe consists of a single strand of DNA of a
known length and sequence. Probes are created in one of two ways,
either by isolating part of a known DNA sample or, more com-
monly, by synthetic production of an oligonucleotide sequence.
Once the desired probe sequence is obtained, it is then labeled with
a radioactive marker. Recalling that bases match only according to
the pattern A-T and G-C, the single-strand probe, when released
into the Southern blot, will seek out and attach itself only to the
single-strand fragments possessing its exactly complementary con-
figuration.22 What results is a blot with several (depending on how
many probes were created and applied) radioactively labeled
double-strand fragment lengths.
5. A piece of X-ray film is then placed in contact with the
blot to create what is called an autoradiograph. At each site where
a radioactive probe paired with complementary fragments, a dark
band will appear, its density varying with the amount of labeled
DNA present at that position on the blot. (See photograph, follow-
ing.) It is this resulting pattern of bands that has been referred to as
an individual's "DNA Fingerprint".23 The idea is in essence that a
restriction enzyme applied to two samples of the same DNA would
yield fragments of the same lengths, while a restriction enzyme ap-
plied to samples of DNA from different individuals would yield
22. For example, a probe fragment consisting of the sequence AATGCC would only
pair with a blot fragment of TTACGG. Bear in mind, however, that these base sequences are
merely used to illustrate the principle involved; the actual size of such probe fragments is
several hundred to several thousand bases long.
23. The name "DNA Fingerprint" is proprietary, despite its increasingly generic usage
in the legal community. Cellmark Diagnostics is the patent holder for the multilocus test
originally developed in England by Dr. Alec Jeffreys.
[Vol. 2
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fragments of different lengths. Since the number of lengths to be
analyzed corresponds to the number of different probes applied, the
degree of specificity of identification increases with the number of
probes used.
As this brief description of the RFLP technique shows, DNA
Analysis is not a comparison of the exact sequence of all the bases
making up the samples analyzed, but is rather a comparison of how
those samples react to restriction enzymes and probes. Thus, it is a
test which when used for inculpatory purposes indicates that a de-
fendant's DNA contains the same pattern of restriction fragments
of particular lengths as does the DNA recovered from biological
samples found at a crime scene. Although the likelihood is at best
very, very slim that such a match could be the result of biological
coincidence, the test remains one of inclusion/exclusion rather than
one of absolute identification, which is quite different from the im-
pression one gets from popular press coverage of the technique.
Calculations of Probability
DNA Analysis is similar to other forms of genetic testing: as
ever greater portions of the population are excluded from the class
of possible sources of the sample in question, the inference of identi-
fication grows stronger. The extraordinarily high probability
figures for inclusion or exclusion obtained through DNA Analysis
are largely responsible for the technique's notoriety. Probability
figures vary according to which probes are used and how many are
applied. The basis for calculation is the number of times a particu-
lar pattern of bands has been observed in applications of a given
probe to DNA samples from different donors. A greatly simplified
calculation will illustrate this process:
476 [Vol. 2
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a. Assume that probes 1, 2 and 3 have each been used in the
DNA Analysis of 2,000 individuals. Phrased another
way, the database for each probe equals 2,000.
b. Every probe application yields a pattern of bands. A
marker is used to plot the location of each band on the
blot and to determine the length of fragments found at
that locus (based on the different rates of travel of various
sized fragments through the electrically charged gel.) The
pattern resulting from each probe application is entered
into the database for that probe.
C. Probes 1, 2 and 3 are applied to the DNA samples to be
used as evidence in a particular case. If, for example, the
defendant's DNA band pattern matches that of the crime
scene sample, the calculation would proceed as follows:
PROBE, resulting pattern
observed 4 times
within the database
(4/2000)
PROBE2  resulting pattern
observed 10 times
within the database
(10/2000)
PROBE3  resulting pattern
observed 2 times
within the database
(2/2000)
frequency of
occurrence = 1
: 500
frequency of
occurrence = 1
: 200
frequency of
occurrence - 1
:1000
d. The three frequency figures are then multiplied:
1/500 X 1/200 X 1/1000 = 1/100,000,000
The resulting figure represents the probability that the two
matching samples (here, DNA from the defendant and DNA
found at the crime scene) came from different individuals.
Evidentiary Uses of DNA
Although DNA Analysis is, like state-of-the-art blood testing,
actually a form of inclusion/exclusion test, its theoretical potential
for extraordinarily high probabilities of establishing identity does
represent an impressive development in forensic science. The use of
DNA Analysis at trial would greatly expand the class of useful, an-
alyzable crime scene samples. Because an individual's DNA is the
1989] 477
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same in all cells regardless of what kind of cells they are,24 virtually
any DNA-containing sample (e.g., hair, blood, semen, skin cells,
bone etc.) would be analyzable. Without DNA Analysis, useful bio-
logical evidence is limited essentially to blood, semen and saliva.
The new technique would not only increase the kinds of useful
evidence, but would also allow for significantly greater flexibility in
terms of the condition of evidence to be analyzed. For example,
current testing methods do not possess the capability to filter out
some of the contamination which quite commonly affects crime
scene samples. To illustrate: in the traditional analysis of semen
stains, the presence of vaginal secretions and microbial contami-
nants may make analysis impossible. Using DNA Analysis, how-
ever, it is possible to separate sperm (carrying the male's DNA)
from other cellular material; thus the contaminants do not interfere
with the analysis or its interpretation. 25 Deterioration of samples
due to their age is another problem for current testing techniques
which will be eliminated in some cases by DNA Analysis; in dry
biological samples, DNA may remain intact for years.26
There are many obvious advantages of DNA Analysis over
traditional means of forensic identification. Fingerprints, for exam-
ple, are often not found at a crime scene and can also be covered,
altered or removed. Similarly, eyewitnesses are often non-existent
and their descriptions may lack crucial details. DNA Analysis is of
potentially enormous value in criminal proceedings. 27 The question
remaining for California appellate courts28 is whether this new form
of scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable for recognition as admis-
sible evidence.
24. The only difference is in quantity: sperm and ova cells have only one copy of DNA
(i.e., these cells contain only a single chromosome) while all other cells contain duplicate
copies (i.e., two chromosomes.)
25. See Gill, Jeffreys & Warrett, Forensic Application of DNA 'Fingerprints", 318 NA-
TuRE 577 (1985). Effects of environmental contaminants are also discussed infra.
26. See, eg., Paabo, Molecular Cloning of Ancient Egyptian Mummy DNA, 314 NA-
TuRE 644 (1985). DNA Analysis has also been utilized in a Pennsylvania homicide investiga-
tion to determine whether the internal organs in an exhumed body were in fact the organs
belonging to that body, or whether the organs had been switched prior to an autopsy in order
to conceal the victim's cause of death; see Marx, DNA Fingerprinting Takes the Witness
Stand, 240 SCIENCE 1616, 1618 (1988).
27. The focus of this comment is on the use of DNA Analysis in a criminal context.
The technique promises to have significant impact in the already highly sophisticated area of
paternity testing as well. See Jeffreys, Brookfield & Semeonoff, Positive Identification of an
Immigration Test Case Using Human DNA Fingerprints, 317 NATURE 318 (1985); White and
Greenwood, supra note 6.
28. At the appellate level, only the Florida Court of Appeal has ruled on the admissibil-
ity of DNA evidence. Andrews v. Florida, 533 So. 2d 841 (1988). See also supra notes 8 and
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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The general purpose of evidence is to shape the fact determin-
ing function of a trial, and in order for evidence to contribute to
that end it must be reliable.2 9 Whenever a party offers evidence
possessing an aura of scientific certainty and infallibility3" and seeks
to present that evidence to the jury via the testimony of an impres-
sively credentialed expert,3 1 a red flag goes up, calling for evaluation
of reliability by the trial judge. Such preadmission screening of
novel scientific evidence ensures that a favorable balance will be
maintained between probative value and potential prejudice due to
jurors' perceptions of "science". Subjecting proposed scientific evi-
dence to an extra measure of scrutiny helps to eliminate the danger
that the "aura of infallibility" surrounding such evidence may con-
ceal the fact that it is actually only experimental, tentative and even
speculative.32
Uniformity of decision is another beneficial consequence.3 3 A
particular type of scientific evidence will likely be accepted across
jurisdictions at more or less the same time based on input from the
scientific community, 34 thus eliminating random acceptance based
on the case-by-case determinations of trial judges, whose personal
assessments of the evidence might vary considerably.35
The Kelly/Frye Standard
To gain admissibility in California, scientific evidence must
show sufficient reliability to pass the Kelly/Frye test.36 The rule
29. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1200
(1980).
30. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 32, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149
(1976).
31. Id. at 31, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
32. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 372-73, 690 P.2d 709, 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236,
251 (1984).
33. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 31, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (1976).
34. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
35. Stare decisis dictates that appellate endorsement of a particular type of scientific
evidence end case-by-case adjudication of admissibility at the trial level. People v. Brown, 40
Cal. 3d 512, 530, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 149 (1976). There are, however, two exceptions to this general rule. First, reliability
of the technique as applied is always an appropriate question at trial. See infra note 81 and
accompanying text. Second, new evidence reflecting a change in the attitude of the relevant
scientific community toward the technique in question may warrant reconsideration of the
issue of admissibility. Kelly at 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
36. There are principally two approaches to the evaluation of scientific evidence. Like
California, most jurisdictions have adopted some form of the standard proposed in Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), discussed in detail infra. The alternative
1989] 479
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originated in Frye v. United States,37 an early case involving the use
of polygraph tests in which the court reasoned:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
In 1976, the California Supreme Court reiterated its express adop-
tion of the Frye approach in People v. Kelly."8 In Kelly, the
voiceprint analysis used to identify the defendant failed to satisfy
the three-part test for admissibility of scientific evidence:
1. The Kelly/Frye test requires that the reliability of the
method used to obtain the scientific evidence be established. As the
Frye court set forth, the proponent of the evidence can demonstrate
its reliability by showing "general acceptance in the relevant scien-
tific community."3 9 Generally, acceptance of a technique will be
shown by expert testimony, which becomes the second part of the
Kelly/Frye analysis.
2. The qualifications of the testifying expert(s) must be estab-
lished, as well as their ability to assess "general acceptance" accu-
rately and impartially.
3. The evidence must also be reliable as applied. This third
test (often associated with Professor McCormick) is based on relevancy, not general accept-
ance. Scrutiny of scientific evidence under the "relevancy approach" is less strict than under
Kelly/Frye, as the relevancy standard for admissibility is merely a favorable balance of proba-
tive value versus prejudicial effect. In approving the admissibility of DNA Analysis in An-
drews v. Florida, the Florida Court of Appeal applied the relevancy approach, rejecting the
Frye general acceptance standard. 533 So. 2d at 846 (1988). For further discussion of the
relevancy test, see Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1968), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 927 (1970); see also Giannelli, supra note 21 at 1232. The passage by California
voters of Proposition 8, which mandates that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any
criminal proceeding," appears directly to conflict with California's retention of the stricter
"general acceptance" standard. Some confusion exists as well as to what the standard for
admissibility is under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal courts applied the Frye test
prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1975, however because the Rules are silent as to
the general acceptance standard, some courts and commentators assume that Frye remains
the standard, while others reject this view. See Giannelli, supra note 29, at 1228. But cf.
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
37. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
38. 17 Cal. 3d at 30 (1976).
39. Giannelli, supra note 29, at 1201. Another way of looking at the question of relia-
bility is to think of evaluating the validity of the underlying scientific principles and then
analyzing how well the method reflects those principles.
[Vol. 2
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element is both a component of the Kelly/Frye test and an area for
continuing scrutiny. After a particular type of scientific evidence
has been accepted by the courts as generally reliable, this part of the
analysis remains a requirement to be addressed on a case-by-case
basis.' Except in cases where the administration of the technique
is shown to be so substandard as to render the results inadmissible,
the evaluation of the application of the method in any given case
will probably be for the trier of fact rather than the court (i.e., it will
become a question of weight and no longer one of admissibility.)
In any examination of the Kelly/Frye test, it is important to
keep in mind that the issue is admissibility, not proof or weight of
the evidence. 4 The question to focus on is whether the scientific
evidence should be assigned any weight whatsoever, not how much
weight it should be given once threshold reliability has been
established.
What Is and Is Not Considered Scientific Evidence?
Examples of techniques to which Kelly/Frye has been applied
in the past decade include bite-mark identification,42 analysis of
footprints/shoeprints,43 the use of a scanning electron microscope
to detect gunshot residue,' electrophoretic testing45 of dried blood-
stains46 and dried semen stains,47 breathalyzer tests48 and hypno-
sis.4 9 As a general rule, Kelly/Frye is not applied to testimony by
experts with regard to medical, psychological or psychiatric tech-
niques, 50 however some recent exceptions exist.5 In line with this
40. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
41. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110-11, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1975).
42. People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1978). Bite-mark identifi-
cation utilizes models, photos, X-rays and comparisons of slides of the victim's wounds with
the defendant's teeth.
43. People v. Puluti, 120 Cal. App. 3d 337, 174 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1981). This is also
known as "Cinderella analysis".
44. People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978).
45. Electrophoresis, accepted by the court in People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d
440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538 (1987), is a technique which is very similar to DNA Analysis in that it involves the
identification of proteins based on their behavior when placed in an electrically-charged gel
slab. See generally HARTL supra note 11, at 353.
46. People v. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1987).
47. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985).
48. See People v. Adams, 59 Cal. App. 3d 559, 131 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1976).
49. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
50. People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 351, 690 P.2d 709, 209 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984); see
also People v. Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1986); People v. Mendibles,
199 Cal. App. 3d 1277, 245 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1988).
51. For example, in People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450
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general rule is the court's refusal to apply Kelly/Frye to dog track-
ing,52 distinguishing "electronic gadgetry" from animate sources of
evidence, whose reliability should be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. 3 The important distinction between expert testimony about
scientific subjects (or, as in this case, about scientific evidence) and
the scientific evidence itself was articulated by the California
Supreme Court in People v. McDonald: 4
When a witness gives his personal opinion on the stand--even if
he qualifies as an expert-the jurors may temper their acceptance
of his testimony with a healthy skepticism born of their knowl-
edge that all human beings are fallible. But the opposite may be
true when the evidence is produced by a machine: like many
laypersons, jurors tend to ascribe an inordinately high degree of
certainty to proof derived from an apparently "scientific" mecha-
nism, instrument, or procedure.
The effect of "science" on jurors' abilities to fairly assign weight to
particular evidence is a recurring theme in any discussion of Kelly!
Frye and is one of the considerations at the heart of preadmission
scrutiny of scientific evidence.
DNA ANALYSIS AND CURRENT KELLY/FRYE STANDARDS
Admissibility of scientific evidence is a question of law for the
court and is thus subject to appellate review, even though it may
involve preliminary determinations of fact.5" The proponent of
DNA evidence, bearing the proof burden, 6 must be prepared to
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the trial judge that the evidence is
reliable by Kelly/Frye standards and that its probative value is not
outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. Each element of the
Kelly/Frye test will be discussed here in light of recent judicial in-
terpretations and applications, with an eye toward examining the
strengths and weaknesses of the case for admission of DNA evi-
dence in California trials. Throughout the discussion it will be im-
portant for the reader to bear in mind that the question for the
(1984), the psychological phenomenon of "Rape Trauma Syndrome" was subjected to Kelly!
Frye analysis when the prosecution sought to introduce the syndrome as evidence that the
complaining witness had in fact been raped. Used for that purpose, evidence of rape trauma
syndrome (in the form of expert testimony) was not found to have gained general acceptance
under Kelly/Frye.
52. People v. Craig, 86 Cal. App. 3d 905, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1978).
53. Id at 914, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
54. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 372 (1984).
55. People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 443, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 482 (1968); CAL.
EVID. CODE §§ 310(a), 402(c), 405(a) (Deering 1986).
56. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 54, 641 P.2d at 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (1982).
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court is not whether DNA Analysis is reliable as a matter of scien-
tific fact, but rather whether it is generally accepted as reliable by
the relevant scientific community. 7
General Acceptance in the Relevant Scientific Community
There are two significant questions to ask at this stage in the
analysis: What constitutes the "relevant" scientific community?;
and, what degree of acceptance will be considered "general"?
Turning to the first of these questions, it appears that courts
will take a relatively broad view. The use of electrophoretic analy-
sis of dried bloodstains in People v. Reilly58 presents a case compa-
rable to DNA Analysis, not only because of the similarities in the
two techniques, but also because few scientists have occasion to use
the techniques for forensic identification, that is, on specimens
which have not been extracted and maintained under ideal labora-
tory conditions. 9 Do only those few forensic scientists make up the
"relevant" community? The Reilly court said no, and viewed the
relevant community as including scientists from broader disciplines
who were knowledgeable about other applications of electrophoretic
blood typing.' ° This would suggest that the opinions of scientists
who use DNA in non-forensic areas (e.g., prenatal screening for ge-
netically transmitted diseases and other diagnostic uses, testing for
the presence of organisms in commercial food preparation, AIDS
research and diagnosis) could be considered when evaluating the
technique's "general acceptance." The relevant community under
this theory might even encompass medical and academic experts.
The California Supreme Court has established an important
limit, however. In People v. Bledsoe,61 where testimony regarding
Rape Trauma Syndrome was not admitted as evidence that a rape
had in fact occurred, the court drew a sharp distinction between
therapeutic and forensic uses of the syndrome. The court stated
that its ruling was "not intended to suggest that rape trauma syn-
drome is not generally recognized or used in the general scientific
community from which it arose, but only that it is not relied on in
that community for the purpose for which the prosecution sought to
use it in this case." (Emphasis added.)6" In other words, the in-
57. Idr at 55, 723 P.2d at 1376, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265. The emphasis here is on accept-
ance of the technique's forensic use, rather than its validity as a general proposition.
58. 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1136, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 501 (1987).
59. Id. at 1138, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
60. Id
61. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
62. Id at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
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quiry must focus on both the make-up of the community and the
technique's use within that community. This interpretation of the
relevant community emphasized the context in which a technique
comes to be "generally accepted."
Context should play an important role in Kelly/Frye analysis.
The purpose of the rule is to screen out unreliable scientific evi-
dence, that is, to ensure that evidence admitted at trial is worthy of
some weight-however small-to aid the jury in its determination
of the facts. s3 Scientific evidence should be reliable as just that: evi-
dence. To what degree does the acceptance of DNA Analysis by
scientists working with non-degraded specimens for non-forensic
purposes indicate evidentiary reliability? Is acceptance of the analy-
sis as used on laboratory samples relevant to the question of accept-
ance of the technique when applied to crime scene samples?
Another contextual consideration arises because the primary
use of DNA evidence would be in criminal trials, more specifically,
in rape and homicide, including capital cases. Due process and gen-
eral notions of fairness to criminal defendants demand that scien-
tific evidence introduced by the prosecution be at the very least
trustworthy in terms of its accuracy.
Context can also be helpful in measuring the trustworthiness of
scientific evidence, in this case by examining the non-forensic stan-
dards applied to the technique in question. For example, the accu-
racy of a blood test for medical purposes is often a matter of life and
death, as a mistake could lead to a transfusion of the wrong type.
Acceptance of a blood typing technique *¢ithin the non-forensic
medical community would thus indicate great trustworthiness in
other contexts as well, since no use could demand greater accuracy
than a life or death situation. Can the same be said of the non-
forensic contexts in which DNA Analysis is used? This is a ques-
tion which should be given some attention by the court in its deter-
mination of the relevancy of a broader scientific community's
acceptance of a technique in establishing that technique's accept-
ance by the narrower forensic community.
The remaining question regarding "general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community" is, how should the trial court deter-
mine whether acceptance of DNA Analysis is sufficiently general?
The Kelly court emphasized the importance of hearing the views
both of proponents of a technique and those who oppose or ques-
63. Pre-screening also guards against jurors giving far greater weight to particular evi-
dence than is warranted by its reliability or actual probative value. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 352 (Deering 1986).
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tion it." So important is the notion of a "fair fight" in California
that trial courts are vested with the power to appoint expert wit-
nesses sua sponte.6 When applied to Kelly/Frye, this enables the
judge to take affirmative steps in accurately ascertaining the views
of the relevant scientific community, not being limited to the views
of those experts produced by the parties. The trial court may also
consider scientific or legal literature relating to the technique's use
or acceptance,66 further promoting active investigation by the court.
The focus of the trial court when evaluating such expert testimony
and outside literature is perhaps not so much acceptance, but signif-
icant opposition to the proposed use of the technique.67 Acceptance
by courts in other jurisdictions may also be relevant,68 bearing in
mind, however, that Kelly/Frye requires acceptance by the scien-
tific, not legal, community.69
A significant determination in applying the "general accept-
ance" standard to DNA Analysis will be whether it should be con-
sidered a wholly new technique or merely a new use of well-
established component techniques, each of which is itself "generally
accepted." Once again, context should play an important role in
deciding whether, for example, general, non-forensic acceptance of
any part of the process involved in DNA Analysis is at all relevant
to acceptance of the entire process for forensic purposes.
Who May Qualify As an Expert?
The next step in establishing the reliability and probative value
of DNA Analysis under Kelly/Frye concerns the qualifications of
the expert witnesses testifying with regard to general acceptance. It
is important to remember that the focus of expert testimony in the
Kelly/Frye context should be whether the technique enjoys general
acceptance, not whether it is based on sound scientific principles.
The testimony of an expert possessing a wealth of knowledge about
molecular genetics and DNA may not be relevant to the question of
DNA's use and acceptance among forensic scientists. Of course, an
expert's academic qualifications and familiarity with the principles
and technology underlying a particular technique are indispensable;
the point being stressed here is simply that these alone are not
enough to qualify him or her to provide relevant testimony on the
64. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 37, 549 P.2d at 1248-49, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53 (1976).
65. CAL. EVID. CODE § 730 (Deering 1986).
66. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 35, 549 P.2d at 1247, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (1976).
67. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 56, 641 P.2d at 797, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265-66 (1982).
68. See supra note 8.
69. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1135, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 500 (1987).
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question of general acceptance.7' Whether an expert is qualified to
testify to general acceptance under Kelly/Frye is a question which is
heavily influenced by how the court measures the boundaries of the
"relevant scientific community." While the trial judge is given
broad discretion in determining the qualifications of an expert,71 the
judge must be careful to distinguish and limit the witness' field of
expertise.72 In other words, there must be a good match between
the witness' background and the scientific community whose ac-
ceptance of the technique has been deemed relevant.
Another key qualification is impartiality.73 However, like the
question of membership in the "relevant" community, there exists
some latitude in assessing an expert's ability to be objective. The
fact that DNA Analysis is performed at present by only three labo-
ratories74 in the United States gives rise to the danger that the only
experts truly qualified to comment on its forensic use and accept-
ance have proprietary or other interests in its judicial acceptance.
This is not as great a problem as it might appear, however, as per-
sonal interest in the success of the technique does not in and of itself
preclude an expert from testifying about its acceptance.75 Personal
interest will be found intolerable only when there is a single expert
testifying as to general acceptance.
The 1987 case People v. Reilly76 provides a good prediction of
how DNA Analysis will fare on this question. In Reilly, the tech-
nique in question was electrophoretic testing of dried bloodstains, 77
an identification test similar to DNA Analysis as to some of the
technology involved and as to the individuals qualified to offer ex-
pert testimony on Kelly/Frye issues.78 In addressing the question of
an expert witness' interest, the court distinguished a tolerable de-
gree of professional interest in a technique's acceptance from that
70. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 39, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (1976). Whether a
particular person qualifies as an expert is a determination to be made on a case-by-case basis.
See generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 720(a) (Deering 1986).
71. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 39, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (1976).
72. Id. at 39, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (quoting People v. King, 266 Cal.
App. 2d 437, 445, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 483 (1968).)
73. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 530, 709 P.2d at 448, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 645 (1985),
rev'don other grounds sub nor. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at
38, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (1976).
74. This will not long remain the situation. DNA Analysis capability is presently being
developed in the public sector, notably by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State of
Virginia and Dade County (Miami), Florida.
75. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1139, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 503 (1987).
76. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1987).
77. See supra note 45.
78. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1139-40, 242 Cal. Rptr. 504-05 (1987).
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which was problematic in Kelly, for example, where the sole expert
witness testifying to general acceptance of voiceprint analysis was a
leading proponent of the technique who had "built his career" on
its reliability.79 The picture which emerges with regard to an ex-
pert's impartiality is that personal interest in the technique's accept-
ance will not prevent scientists involved in the development or
employment of DNA Analysis from qualifying as Kelly/Frye expert
witnesses. So long as personal interest can be "distributed" onto
the combined testimony of a fair number of experts representing a
cross-section of the relevant scientific community, the courts will
probably be tolerant of a degree of bias which would render a sole
spokesperson unreliable on the issue of general acceptance.
The final aspect in assessing the qualifications of experts in-
volves drawing a distinction between "mere" technicians and "qual-
ified" scientists, in other words distinguishing know-how from
"know-why". Technicians whose sphere of personal knowledge ex-
tends no further than' following prescribed routines are thought un-
qualified to establish the validity of a new technique.8 0 This
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis, however, as
there may be "technicians" whose background and forensic work
meet Kelly/Frye standards, and "scientists" whose familiarity with
theoretical principles is too far removed from the forensic context to
be of value for Kelly/Frye purposes. The DNA analyst is an excel-
lent example of the former based on two considerations. First, the
technology involved in DNA Analysis demands that analysts per-
forming the test possess significant understanding of underlying
principles (e.g., holding degrees in molecular biology or closely re-
lated fields.) Second, the work of forensic laboratory personnel ex-
ceeds the responsibility of the average technician's role in
performing scientific tests. The DNA analyst is involved in more
decision-making (e.g., data interpretation) and less routinization
than technicians performing other laboratory tasks. This will prob-
ably prove quite helpful in terms of a Kelly/Frye test: analysts testi-
fying as experts would enlarge the cross-section of the scientific
community offering views on general acceptance, providing a more
meaningful opportunity for the court to learn of opposition or reser-
vations about the technique, while at the same time helping to dissi-
pate individual experts' personal interests in the technique's
acceptance.8 '
79. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 38, 549 P.2d at 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153 (1976).
80. Id at 39, 549 P.2d at 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154; Giannelli, supra note 29, at 1214.
81. It is important to note that all evidence which purports to establish the presence of
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Reliability of the Technique As Applied
The third of three parts in the Kelly/Frye analysis focuses not
on theoretical reliability, but on actual reliability: should the scien-
tific evidence presented be admitted in the specific case at hand?
This question presents entirely different problems for DNA Analy-
sis than did the question of "general acceptance". In fact, due to
the inherent complexity of the technique and the heightened role of
the technician, DNA Analysis may find its greatest challenge to ad-
missibility here.
Inquiry in the area of reliability "as applied" involves basically
two considerations. First, how well or poorly the test was per-
formed; second, to what extent deterioration or contamination of
the biological evidence may have affected the test results. With re-
gard to the first of these, DNA Analysis provides even the most
competent analyst with many opportunities for human error. For
example, at every stage in the procedure involving a transfer of all
or part of the sample from one container or mixture into another,
the opportunity exists for mislabeling, mismeasurement or acciden-
tal contamination. Errors in perception or documentation of results
are also possible.8 2 The possibility of erroneous identifications due
to mistakes by lab personnel is a fertile area for challenging the va-
lidity of DNA evidence.83 Because technicians involved in DNA
Analysis are called upon to interpret as well as produce test results,
an individual's training and experience in performing the test will
be a focus of this inquiry as well.84 In general, however, the ques-
tion whether a particular test was competently executed has no spe-
a defendant at a crime scene (or, in the case of paternity testing, within a child's genetic
make-up) will always be subject to analysis of how reliably the technique was applied in
making the identification. In other words, this inquiry is not limited to the Kelly/Frye con-
text. The distinction must be made, however, between pre- and post-acceptance scrutiny. In
the latter, the possibility of error in the application of a technique is no longer a question of
admissibility, but rather goes to the weight accorded that evidence. People v. Farmer, 47
Cal.3d 888, 913, 765 P.2d 940, 956, 254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 524 (1989); People v. Palmer, 80 Cal.
App. 3d at 253, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 472-73 (1978).
82. The cause of most laboratory errors in DNA Analysis is the mix-up of samples.
Most labs have procedures for avoiding mix-ups as part of their overall quality assurance
programs.
83. Special attention should be paid to the quality control procedures of any laboratory
performing DNA Analysis. The need for adequate means of error detection was acutely
demonstrated by the results of a recent study from the California Association of Crime Lab
Directors. In blind sample tests given to the three private labs currently performing DNA
Analysis, only one of the three correctly matched all the samples. Both of the other labs
produced one incorrect match out of approximately 50 samples. Even proponents of the
technique agree that such a high rate of error is unacceptable. See Thompson, The Myth of
DNA Fingerprints, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, April 1989, at 34.
84. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1138, 292 Cal. Rptr. at 503 (1987).
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cial application in the case of DNA Analysis. An evaluation of the
DNA analyst's care and skill will follow much the same lines as in
an evaluation of other kinds of tests (e.g., blood, breathalyzer etc.)
New questions appear in the evaluation of the condition of evi-
dence found at a crime scene and effects it might produce on the
test's outcome.8 5 Of particular concern will be the effects of aging,
drying, temperature and contamination from foreign organic sub-
stances (i.e., substances containing their own DNA.) A significant
problem would arise if any of these factors were to cause a change
in DNA which could go undetected, producing an inaccurate result
rather than no result at all. The response from proponents (includ-
ing many researchers) is that DNA tends to "go away" when dam-
aged, rather than change type. Thus, environmental damage
sufficient to cause a structural change would likely yield no result or
at least a result so irregular as to make it both immediately suspect
and-more important-virtually unmatchable to any DNA sample
taken directly from a defendant. If true, this cuts in favor of de-
fendants. Due to the irregular and unmatchable result which would
be obtained, a crime scene sample in questionable condition would
tend to produce false exclusion rather than false inclusion.
Environmental effects on DNA and on the accuracy of DNA
Analysis are the subject of a great deal of current research.
Although the lack of extensive information in this area remains one
of the strongest arguments against admissibility, proponents main-
tain that sufficient research data already exist to preclude inexplica-
ble test results because DNA's deterioration and contamination by
particular substances can be defined in terms of known chemical
processes. As for the more realistic situation, where crime scene
DNA has been exposed to any number of unknown environmental
factors, researchers point out that it is unnecessary to know pre-
cisely what has happened to a sample because circumstances and
the environment itself limit the range of possible exposure. For ex-
ample, we know as a general proposition that samples found any-
where in the United States will not have been exposed to
temperatures greater than 150" F in the absence of highly unusual
circumstances. But what of those cases where such circumstances
do exist? 6
85. Discussion of this issue with regard to electrophoretic testing is found in Brown, 40
Cal. 3d 512, 530, 709 P.2d 440, 448, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 645 (1985) and Reilly, 196 Cal. App.
3d 1127, 1150, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496, 511 (1987).
86. Consider, for example, the 1988 Kansas homicide trial in which DNA Analysis of
blood found on the side of a crematorium oven was used to connect the victim's remains with
the scene of the murder. See Michaud, supra note 5 at 88.
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Questions such as this may be beyond the scope of Kelly/Frye,
as they arguably affect the weight given to DNA evidence in a par-
ticular case rather than the admissibility of DNA evidence gener-
ally. Nonetheless, the issue of environmentally damaged samples is
one which will continue to bear upon the use of DNA Analysis even
after various forms of the technique8 7 are deemed admissible. Pros-
ecution and defense alike should remain alert to the many issues
surrounding reliability "as applied", both as they relate to Kelly/
Frye and for the purpose of impeaching DNA evidence once
admitted.
PROBLEMS OF ADMISSIBILITY BEYOND KELLY/FRYE
DNA Analysis raises some unique questions which could affect
its admissibility despite a showing of "general acceptance". Be-
cause of the highly technical nature of DNA Analysis, the danger
exists that its probative value will be outweighed by the conse-
quences of its complexity.88 Consider, for example, the undue time
consumption which might result from a "battle of the expert wit-
nesses" on the subject of how much weight DNA Analysis should
receive given the circumstances of a particular test (e.g., condition
of the sample, conclusiveness of the result etc.) Inflated representa-
tions about the test's accuracy and infallibility might lead to a simi-
lar debate among experts. Clearly, some degree of agreement as to
the technique's basic reliability must exist within the legal commu-
nity as well as the scientific community if extravagant arguments
about peripheral issues are to be avoided at trial.
Parties seeking to introduce DNA evidence must also be mind-
ful of the temptation to take advantage of lay jurors' tendency to
give "considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence ... presented by
'experts' with impressive credentials." 8 9 Substantial prejudice may
also arise because of jurors' inability to question meaningfully the
results of DNA Analysis based on anything other than the argu-
ments presented by the parties. "Common sense", the traditional
dominion of the jury,9" is of minimal use in the evaluation of bio-
87. As noted earlier (supra note 18), the RFLP technique described in this comment is
but one of several and potentially many techniques for identifying an individual based on
DNA. The area of forensic science which identifies individuals on the basis of their DNA is
still at a formative stage. We can anticipate the emergence of new methods of DNA Analysis
in the future, analogous to developments in the area of bloodtesting in recent decades.
88. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (Deering 1986).
89. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 31, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (1976).
90. The very existence of the jury and its role in assigning weight to the evidence admit-
ted at trial is one of the most fundamental notions of our legal system, and perhaps the most
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chemical and statistical principles beyond the scope of common un-
derstanding. The danger is, of course, that lay jurors will be so
overwhelmed by sophisticated scientific explanations of the evi-
dence presented that they will abandon their fact-finding responsi-
bilities, opting simply to defer to the judgment of "experts" who
"really understand" what the evidence means.91 DNA Analysis is
particularly susceptible to producing this result. Unlike bite-mark
identification 92 or shoeprint analysis,9 3 where the jury can use its
own powers of observation to see the models, X-rays, plaster casts
etc. used to arrive at a particular conclusion, DNA evidence is
based on biochemical observations which cannot be conceptualized
on the basis of jurors' own experience or intuition.94
This is not to say, however, that complexity necessarily leads
to juror confusion. Highly sophisticated methods of blood testing,
also beyond the common knowledge of lay jurors, have been ac-
cepted by courts for many years without destroying the ability of
juries to render meaningful verdicts in cases where such tests have
been utilized. This fact speaks well for jurors' patience with scien-
tific evidence and for attorneys' willingness to make the evidence
understandable. However, patience alone will not make DNA evi-
dence comprehensible. While it is not necessary that jurors under-
stand all of the intricate details of DNA Analysis, they must be
given sufficient information to fairly assign it weight relative to all
other evidence presented in a given case. A verdict based largely on
evidence which was either beyond jurors' comprehension or misun-
derstood would arguably violate a criminal defendant's right to due
process. This danger does exist with DNA Analysis, and will be
amplified if courts are willing to admit DNA evidence despite many
uncertainties.
The idea that as yet unresolved issues should affect only the
weight of the evidence and not its admissibility demands too much
of future jurors. Foreseeable weaknesses in DNA Analysis should
striking difference between trials under Common Law and Civil Law. See, e.g., GRUNDGE-
saz [GG] § 103 (W. Ger.); ZiVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] §§ 313, 139 (W. Ger.). Care
must be taken to prevent increasingly complex scientific evidence from becoming "self-vali-
dating", thereby usurping the jury's function.
91. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 111, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1975) (citing
People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 332 (1968).)
92. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975).
93. People v. Puluti, 120 Cal. App. 3d 337 (1981); see also People v. Barker, 113 Cal.
App. 3d 743 (1980) ordered depublished, printed unofficially only at 170 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1980).
94. Although this factor was not a bar to admission under the relevancy approach, the
Florida Court of Appeal did note that this aspect of DNA evidence "requires courts to pro-
ceed with special caution." 533 So. 2d at 850 (1988).
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be adequately addressed prior to the technique's acceptance, rather
than being left to the discretion of lay jurors when those weaknesses
actually do arise. In addition, there is some fundamental unfairness
in the idea that different juries could produce wholly inconsistent
and irreconcilable results because weight was assigned based on
guesswork instead of reason.
The fact that DNA Analysis will most often be used to identify
the perpetrator of a crime warrants extra restraint in its admis-
sion.95 As one court has observed, "A courtroom is not a research
laboratory. The fate of a defendant in a criminal prosecution
should not hang on his ability to successfully rebut scientific evi-
dence which bears an 'aura of special reliability and trustworthi-
ness'." 9 6 The key to a fair fight lies in adequate exploration of the
technique's limitations-not merely its capabilities-so that war-
ranted rebuttal of DNA evidence will not be precluded by sheer
lack of information. A special responsibility rests on the legal com-
munity. Lawyers must take time to learn how to scrutinize DNA
evidence so that its admission is not permitted to go unchallenged.
PROPOSALS
What follow are suggestions regarding the admission and fu-
ture use of DNA Analysis. They are based in part on the treatment
of roughly analogous forms of scientific evidence by courts and the
legislature in recent years.
A Name Change
The popular name "DNA Fingerprint" should be eliminated
from courtroom use. Originators of the technique called it a "fin-
gerprint" based on the term's common scientific usage (referring
generally to a complex pattern of uniquely identifying features.)
The problem here is that the term "fingerprint" has a much more
narrow usage in a legal context. To state the problem another way,
jurors have pre-existing notions about the sources and significance
of traditional fingerprints which should not be simply transferred to
a DNA "fingerprint".
The fate of the polygraph test in California 97 is an example of
the impact of a popular name. Compounding the polygraph's per-
95. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (1976); People v.
Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 332 438 P.2d 33, 39, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 505 (1968).
96. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977).
97. CAL. EvID. CODE § 351.1 (Deering 1986).
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sistent reliability problems98 was the perceived prejudicial effect of
the term "lie detector." Largely in response to the 1982 passage of
Proposition 8, the "Victims' Bill of Rights", 99 the State Legislature
added section 351.1 to the Evidence Code in 1984 to ensure that
polygraph results, which in addition to being of questionable value
had come to be known as "lie detectors", would be inadmissible in
criminal proceedings.
Statutory Control
The mandate of Proposition 8, that no relevant evidence be ex-
cluded from a criminal proceeding, could have significant impact on
the use of DNA evidence. Because even evidence of somewhat
questionable integrity could be considered "relevant" by Proposi-
tion 8 standards, foresight should be exercised on the part of the
State Legislature so as to prevent or restrict the admission of "rele-
vant" but arguably unreliable kinds of evidence."° As set forth
within the language of Proposition 8,101 this can be accomplished
through legislation enacted by a two-thirds vote of both the Senate
and the Assembly. Because of the potential prejudicial effects of
DNA Analysis, the development of sound legislation to guide its
future use as evidence may be an appropriate precaution.
The treatment of testimony under hypnosis in the California
Evidence Code" 2 provides a model.103 Section 795 sets forth
sharply limited conditions under which posthypnotic testimony will
be admitted in criminal proceedings. The primary benefit of enact-
ing a similar set of guidelines for the use of DNA Analysis would be
the promotion of uniformity in admissibility and interpretation.
98. See, eg., People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957); People v. Jones, 52
Cal. 2d 636, 343 P.2d 577 (1959).
99. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28, added by initiative measure June 8, 1982. Proposition 8
provides, inter alia: "(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter
enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding..."
100. The relevancy approach to the admission of scientific evidence is discussed supra
note 36.
101. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28.
102. CAL. EVID. CODE §*795 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1989).
103. The enactment of Evidence Code § 795 in 1984 was probably prompted by passage
of Proposition 8 (supra note 99). Although the California Supreme Court determined that
testimony obtained using hypnosis was unreliable in People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641
P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982), Proposition 8 nonetheless threatened to make such
evidence admissible based on some degree of relevance despite a margin of unreliability. The
legislative response was to enact this Evidence Code provision which has the twofold effect of
permitting the use of hypnosis under specified circumstances, while at the same preventing its
use under any but those conditions.
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Statutory regulation is especially warranted in light of the serious-
ness of the criminal cases in which DNA evidence will be typically
presented.
There are, however, drawbacks to the use of overly tight statu-
tory control. Because DNA Analysis remains a developing forensic
tool, the techniques employed are likely to undergo refinements and
changes which would make such legislation quickly obsolete. One
solution might be to create a statute which includes a "sunset provi-
sion" (i.e., one which will automatically be subject to review, revi-
sion, or repeal at the close of a specified period.) Another danger
posed by a statute is the creation of undue bureaucracy surrounding
use of the technique. Consider, for example, the sixteen pages of
regulations governing breathalyzer tests contained in the California
Administrative Code."° "Title 17" lays out specific regulations for
virtually every phase of forensic breath alcohol analysis, including
laboratory maintenance, licensing, personnel, record keeping, the
collection and handling of samples, as well as the procedures used
in the analysis itself.105 To avoid saddling DNA Analysis with sim-
ilarly rigid (and potentially obsolete) rules, drafters of a statutory
provision should take care to focus on the legal issues concerning
admissibility and courtroom use, rather than attempting to regulate
the specific laboratory processes involved in creating DNA
evidence.
Jury Instructions
A sua sponte instruction"0 6 should be required in any proceed-
ing where DNA evidence has been admitted. The purpose of the
instruction is to remind jurors that DNA Analysis alone does not
prove a defendant's guilt, but rather produces evidence which is to
be weighed along with all other evidence in reaching their verdict.
It should be explained that DNA Analysis linking the defendant to
the crime scene and/or to the victim is merely associative evidence,
which may be rebutted by the defendant's explanation of circum-
stances surrounding the presence of his or her DNA (i.e., hair,
blood etc.) at a particular place. The instruction could also signifi-
cantly reduce the problem of too much deference to expert testi-
mony (if introduced post-Kelly/Frye) by reminding jurors that such
104. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, §§ 1215-1222.2 (1985).
105. See also People v. Adams, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 562, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (1976).
106. A sua sponte jury instruction is one which the judge must give under prescribed
circumstances whether or not it has been requested by either party.
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testimony is designed to aid them in their determination of the facts,
not to make that determination for them.
An example of a jury instruction to be given sua sponte in every
criminal case1" 7 is section 2.27 of California Jury Instructions-
Criminal (CALJIC), regarding the sufficiency of the testimony of
one witness. Important information contained in any statutory pro-
visions regarding DNA Analysis could also be brought to the atten-
tion of the jury in a sua sponte instruction. For example, the
definition of an accomplice and restrictions on accomplice testi-
mony as codified in section 1111 of the California Penal Code must
be presented to the jury in cases where this information is applica-
ble.108 The language of Penal Code section 1111 appears virtually
verbatim in CALJIC sections 3.10 and 3.11.109 Jury instructions in
combination with Evidence Code provisions110 would ensure that
the use of DNA Analysis in courtroom proceedings is kept within
its appropriate bounds.
The Statistical Basis for Evaluation
Population studies to establish gene frequencies must be more
extensive. The results of DNA Analysis are interpreted according
to how frequently (or, more appropriately, how rately) particular
restriction fragment lengths appear in relevant population groups.
At this time, population data remain to some extent speculative be-
cause of insufficient opportunity for the DNA typing of a large
number of individuals."' The use of unreliable statistics in the in-
terpretation of DNA evidence gives rise to probabilities lacking
foundation, similar to those condemned in People v. Collins.'12 A
positive step toward providing population data has already been
taken in California. A law passed in 1985 mandates that all con-
victed sex offenders must provide blood and saliva specimens at the
time of their release from prison. While the articulated purpose of
this requirement is to establish a data bank of DNA typing (a high-
tech version of "mug shot" collections), it will have the added bene-
107. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 884, 538 P.2d 247, 261, 123 Cal. Rptr.
119, 133 (1975).
108. People v. Gordon, 10 Cal. 3d 460, 470, 516 P.2d 298, 304, 110 Cal. Rptr. 906, 912
(1973); People v. Bivens, 54 Cal. 2d 71, 76, 351 P.2d 776, 779, 4 Cal. Rptr. 504, 507 (1960).
109. See also CALJIC sections 3.12, 3.16, 3.18.
110. See infra text accompanying note 102.
111. Sensabaugh, supra note 10 at 394.
112. 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968); cf. People v. Marx, 54 Cal.
App. 3d at 112, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (1975).
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ficial effect of creating a large sample of DNA Analysis for statisti-
cal evaluation.
CONCLUSION
DNA Analysis will in all likelihood gain acceptance by the
courts and become an everyday part of criminal prosecutions in the
very near future. This is only the beginning. The influences of sci-
ence and technology continue to grow in virtually every profession,
the law being no exception. As a result, lawyers must be prepared
now more than ever before to deal appropriately with the special
problems created by the use of scientific evidence. Issues raised go
beyond the components of the Kelly/Frye analysis for admissibility
and beyond the problems of undue time consumption, juror confu-
sion, and the like. The real danger is the temptation to accept with-
out question new forms of scientific evidence which promise to
revolutionize criminal or civil trials.
Patience is the key to fair and valuable use of evidence such as
DNA Analysis. A cautious approach to its introduction in criminal
prosecutions is warranted despite what appear to be inviting oppor-
tunities to test the promising capabilities of the new technique. The
danger of premature introduction cuts both ways: once deemed ad-
missible, DNA Analysis will be with us to stay, no longer suscepti-
ble to any but the most sophisticated challenges to its reliability;
once rejected by an appellate court, however, this potentially inval-
uable forensic tool could become the object of mistrust and remain
largely- unused.
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